World War I dramatically aggravated class and national controversies
in all the countries involved in the conflict, especially the
multinational Russian Empire.
Hostilities took place in Transcaucasia as well, agents smuggled into
Georgia from Turkey were trying to incline Ajaria and Abkhazia to
separatism. On the other hand, active steps were taken by Russian
chauvinistic-minded circles, making efforts to annex Abkhazia and join
it to Kuban district.That compaign had started in the 90s of the
century. The civil Head Chief of Caucasia Prince Golitsyn and Exarch
Alexei advised the Chief Procurator of Synod: "It would be desirable to
alienate Sukhumi Eparchy with its predominantly Abkhaz and Russian
population from the undesirable Georgian influence. With this in view,
it would be useful to join Sukhumi Eparchy to Kuban. Kuban district is
inhabited by 1,716,245 pure Russians, orthodox believers. This great
mass will easily absorb the multilingual 100,000 population of the Black
Sea coast." (*1)
The tsarist government impudently violated the territorial integrity of
Georgia, in particular, Abkhazia, by isolating the area of Gagra
climatic station from Sukhumi district and formally joining it to Sochi
district of the Black Sea "gubernia", (*2)
pursuant to the Emperor's order of 25 December, 1904. The new border
between Sukhumi district and the Black Sea "gubernia" ran along the r.
Bzyb.
As it follows from prince Golitsyn's letter of 25 May, 1904 to the
minister of interior affairs, the new border was based on the interest
only of the Gagra climatic station founded by Prince Alexander of
Oldenburg. Meanwhile, the ministry of farming and state property was
pursuing an object of inhabiting part of Gagra region with Russian
settlers who would enjoy preferential rules that were in effect in the
Black Sea "gubernia".
As a result of that absolutely unnatural change of the border,
Sukhumi district lost over 150,000 dessiatinas of stateowned forests and
summer mountain pastures employed by Gudauta area population, which were
transferred to the Black Sea gubernia.
On 30 October, 1917 a special meeting of "Ozakom" (*3)
presided by A. Chkhenkeli discussed an application of Sukhumi district
commissariat on joining Gagra and Bzyb areas back to Sukhumi district.
The main reason given for restoring the historic boundaries was a
"necessity to provide the native population with mountain pastures and
forests, in view of forthcoming settlement of the agrarian problem at
the Constitutional Assembly." The petition was supported by the
population of Old Gagra, New Gagra and Alahadzy where a referendum had
been held. The petition said: "Since the main reason for changing in
1904 the boundaries between Sukhumi district and the Black Sea gubernia
were based on the considerations set forth by Prince Alexander of
Oldenburg, the founder of the Gagra climatic station, pursuing solely
the interest of the said station and neglecting the interests of the
native population of Sukhumi district, the special Transcaucasian
committee admits that it is but legitimate to restore the former
boundary" (*4).
Thus, the tsarist government, in pursue of far future objects, had
been expanding Russian settlements on the Black-Sea shores of Abkhazia,
at the same time suppressing the democratic circles of Abkhazians and
Georgians who always strove to preserve brotherhood between the two
peoples. This process was especially well manifested in the years of
reaction and World War I.
However, all the attempts to carry out the policy of splitting the two
fraternal peoples failed. The democratically-minded intelligentsia of
Georgia and Abkhazia succeeded in strengthening the unity of Georgians
and Abkhazians.
A deputation of Abkhaz representatives visited the Viceroy in Tbilisi in
the April of 1916. The deputation (they were M. Shervashidze, M.
Emukhvari, A. Inal-Ipa, P. Anchabadze, B. Ezukhbaya, A. Shukbar and
others) put forward the demands of the Abkhaz people to the Caucasian
authorities, namely: more attention to Abkhazia, better services and
utilities for the town of Sukhumi, expansion of the school system, road-
building^, teaching children in the Georgian and Abkhaz languages. (*5)
Tsarism kept following its policy of Russification of the Caucasian
peoples and hindered the development of local languages, such as
Georgian and Abkhazian.
An official in the Viceroy's office E.G. Weidenbaum wrote in a memorandum: "The Abkhaz language which has neither writing, nor literature, is certainly doomed to extinction. The question is: Which language will replace it? Obviously, it ought to be the Russian rather than the Georgian language that will be a conductor of culture and general outlook to the population. Therefore, in my opinion, the founding of the Abkhaz written language must not be an object in itself, but a means to reduce the demand for the Georgian language through the church and school, and replace it gradually by the state language" (*6) (i. e. Russian - A. M.). And those ideas were implemented very soon indeed.
The demands of the said deputation contained a question on transforming Sukhumi district into a separate gubernia and not joining it to any other unit, such as, the Black Sea gubernia. The petition read: "If it appears impossible to change Sukhumi district into a separate gubernia and necessary to join it to any other gubernia, then Sukhumi district ought to be joined to Kutaisi gubernia. Being closely tied by blood relationship with the Georgian church in the past and present the Sukhumi eparchy can on no account be separated from it" (*7).
Arrival of the deputation in Tbilisi caused a great response among
the Georgian intelligentsia and charity organizations of the town. The
newspapers published reports on its stay, the demands set forth by the
deputation, photographs of some of its members. The Georgian society
welcomed the developing national self-consciousness of the Abkhaz
people, and rejected those separatistic ideas that some
reactionary-minded persons tried to sow among the Georgian and Abkhaz
people (*8).
In the November of 1917 the Mensheviks organized a peasants' congress in
Sukhumi, where the Abkhaz People's Council (APC) was elected. On 9
February, 1918 the right nationalists of the APS (A. Shervashidze, M.
Emkhvari, N. Margania, Colonel N. Chkhotua, B. Tsaguria) met in Tbilisi
with the members of the executional committee of the National Council of
Georgia A. Chkhenkeli, K. Meskhi, G. Gvazava, M. Sakvarelidze, N.
Kartsivadze to discuss the nearest future relationships between Georgia
and Abkhazia. This meeting revealed the desire of the Abkhaz deputation
to achieve political independence of Abkhazia by all means, "having but
neighborly relations with Georgia as an equal neighbour" (*9).
Representatives of the Georgian National Council expressed their desire
to see Abkhazia as a part of Georgia enjoying full internal autonomy. A.
Chkhenkeli said, on behalf of the National Council, that Georgians
support the idea of restoring territorial unity of Sukhumi district
violated in 1904.
"It is our aim", Chkhenkeli noted, "to restore Sukhumi district as Abkhazia." (*10) He thought that it could be done only after Abkhazia had given up membership in the "Union of United Mountain Peoples of Caucasia" created in the Fall of 1917. A representative of Samurzakano district M. Emukhvari pointed out that the population of that district would not join the said union and therefore gave up any contacts with Abkhazia. It was also reported that the Abkhazians would not be in the majority in the joint Sukhumi district (*11).
Eventually, the representatives of Abkhazia agreed with A.
Chkhenkeli's project suggesting broader internal autonomy of Abkhazia
within Georgia, the latter assuming commitments to restore the old
historic borders of Abkhazia. The project was to be discussed by the
Abkhaz People's Council in order to draw an appropriate resolution.
Direct Turkish expansion and armed mass actions of the people lead by
Bolsheviks aggravated the situation in Transcaucasia after creation of
the Transcaucasian Sejm which refused to recognize the Brest peace
treaty.
The Abkhazian letter of 17 June 1988 addressed to the Presidium of XIX All-Union Party Conference gave an inambiguous interpretation of the Bolshevist actions in the spring and summer of 1918 that involved various regions of Georgia, namely, as the struggle of the Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples for the Soviet power which "the Mensheviks drowned in blood". The writers of the letter deliberately ignored the fact that such actions took place in other parts of Georgia and were crushed down by the armed forces of the Georgian Democratic Republic. Therefore, the repressions of 1918-20 against the rebels of Abkhazia and South Ossetia can't be interpreted as a struggle of the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic against the Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples. Suffice it to mention only some instances of suppression of Bolshevik-lead actions of peasants in Lechkhumi, Dusheti, Zugdidi and other ouezds in the summer of 1918.
On 25 June 1918 the Georgian government met to discuss the events in
Dusheti and Lechkhumi ouezds and decided to use armed forces of the
regular army and national guard to crush down the uprisings there (*12).
Moreover, the rebels of Lechkhumi established the Soviet power in the
February of 1918, and the ouezd was "outlawed" by the Transcaucasian
Sejm.
The repressions of the uprisings of 1918 were also urged by foreign
policy considerations. The Turkish aggression was threatening the whole
of Transcaucasia. Meanwhile, there were some forces inside this country
that were gravitating towards Turkey, for instance, the propertied
classes of Abkhazia who asked Turkey for patronage hoping to choke down
the Soviet power in their districts with the help of the Turkish troops.
(*13) A. Chkhenkeli reported to the National
Council: "The Turks decided to send troops to occupy Sukhumi and started
the preparations. However, soon they were informed that our troops had
seized Sukhumi and driven out the Bolsheviks.
This news was like a bolt from the blue as they had never expected
such a turn in the events and had to waive their designs" (*14).
On the first anniversary of independence of Georgia, Minister of
interior affairs N. Ramishvili reported to the Constitutional Assembly:
"The young, not yet quite strong state of Georgia was obliged to resort
to emergency measures so as to put an end to anarchy, by sending troops
and regiments of the National Guard into places drawn in the anarchist
actions. It was necessary to use armed forces in order to choke down the
uprising in different parts of the Republic, namely, in Sachkhere and
Lechkhumi ouezds and in Odishi, The situation was as bad in Abkhazia
where a group of individuals, driven by their personal considerations
and discontent over the basic reforms, turned for help to a foreign
country while agitating the people here for an uprising" (*15).
The struggle of Abkhazian Bolsheviks against the democratic government
of Georgia went on in the time when "the dark Turkish force was
surrounding the country and we weren't sure whether the Sun would rise
for us in the morn or not, or whether we would fall preys to the Turkish
aggression. It was the matter of death or life of the revolution and
further existence of the whole nation. Batumi was occupied by the enemy
who had crossed the Georgian frontier and was just at a few kilometers'
distance from Tbilisi. Negotiations with the enemy were out of the
question. Treason inside and the sword outside - such was the situation
in which Georgia found itself at that time", the Ertoba newspaper
reported on 26 May, 1919.
After the declaration of independence of Georgia on 26 May, 1918, a
delegation of the Abkhaz People's Council consisting of R. Kakuba, G.
Tumanov, V. Gurjua and G. Ajamov, arrived in Tbilisi for negotiations
with the Georgian government.
The talks started early in June, 1918. This is what was recorded in the
minutes of the meeting on 6 June, 1918:
"A delegate of the Abkhaz People's Council, R. I. Kakuba, greeting the
government of the Georgian republic, points out the common interests of
the Abkhaz and Georgian peoples, their spiritual closeness, and
expresses a wish to see these relations preserved after the Abkhaz
People's Council comes to full power in Abkhazia, and hopes that the
government of the Georgian republic will extend friendly assistance in
the organization of the state power in Abkhazia.
The Chairman, War minister G. T. Georgadze, greeting the Abkhazian
delegation, emphasizes the common ideas and inspirations of the Abkhaz
and Georgian peoples and expresses a wish to secure formally and
practically the brotherly relations of the two peoples. Further, two
documents of the Abkhaz Council are announced.
The first document of the Abkhaz People's Council informs the Georgian
National Council that further to the declaration of independence of
Georgia, Abkhazia lost the legislative basis of relations with Georgia
and now the whole power in Abkhazia has transferred to the Abkhaz
People's Council. The Abkhaz People's Council, taking into consideration
the common interests of Abkhazia and Georgia, expects that the Georgian
National Council will assist to organize independent statehood in
Abkhazia, leaving a regiment of the Georgian Red Guard at the Council's
disposal, and at the same time brings to the Georgian National Council's
notice its protests against the orders given by the Government of the
Georgian Republic in the territory of Abkhazia, as violating the
sovereign rights of the Abkhaz People's Council. In order to clarify all
those questions and carry on negotiations with the Government of the
Georgian Republic, the Abkhaz People's Council delegated its
representatives R. I. Kakuba, V. G. Gurjua, G. D. Ajamov arid G. D.
Tumanov.
The second document of the Abkhaz People's Soviet informs the government of the Georgian Republic that as Abkhazia, being a rightful member of the Transcaucasian Federative Republic, bears part of the debts of the broken up Republic, the Abkhaz People's Council considers it necessary to take equal part in the work of the liquidation commission and authorizes its representatives V. G Gurjua, G. D. Ajamov and G. D. Tumanov.
R. I. Kakuba answers a number of questions set by the Georgian
ministers-thus illustrating the actual situation in Abkhazia.
It follows from R. Kakuba's report that the Abkhaz People's Council is
going to call a conference of representatives of all peoples inhabiting
Abkhazia. The elections of the delegates of that Peoples Conference will
be carried out in four stages.
At the moment there are several political trends in Abkhazia, that
correspond to various orientations: thus, the propertied landowners are
obviously gravitating towards Turkey hoping that it will help to restore
their lost rights; there is some Bolshevist-oriented tendency; and part
of the population sympathizes with the North Caucasian mountain peoples.
To fight back all these tendencies, the Abkhaz People's Council is
counting on the assistance of the Georgian government and hopes that the
Georgian Red Guard will be left in Abkhazia and help its government and
a newly, organized international detachment in the struggle against
those elements.
Being in need of money, the Abkhaz People's Council expects that Georgia
will offer it financial assistance.
To settle all these questions, the Georgian government assigns Ministers
Sh. Meskhishvili and N. Khomeriki to compile the text of the agreement
between the two nations.
After the adoption of this resolution the delegates of the Abkhaz
people's Council leave the meeting" (*16)…
On 8 June 1918 the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgian and
the Abkhaz People's Council signed a treaty that developed and added to
the agreement of 8 June, 1918, between the National Council of Georgia
and Abkhaz People's Council. The new agreement stated:
1) An office of Minister of Abkhazian affairs is to be
established in the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia by
representation of the Abkhaz People's Council;
2) The internal and self-government in Abkhazia will be exercised
by the Abkhaz People's Council;
3) The credits and cash required for administration of Abkhazia
will be provided by the Democratic Republic of Georgia and used by the
Abkhaz People's Council for the needs of Abkhazia;
4) The government sends a detachment of the Red Guard at the
disposal of the Abkhaz People's Council to help the latter to set the
revolutionary order and organize a strong power;
5) An international detachment will be organized in Abkhazia and
be at the disposal of the Abkhaz People's Council;
6) Social reforms in Abkhazia will be carried out by the Abkhaz
People's Council on the basis of general laws of Georgia and with proper
consideration of local specific requirements;
7) A conference of the Abkhazian population will be culled as
soon as possible on democratic principles with thr purpose to make final
decisions concerning the system of Abkhazia (*17).
The treaty was signed by N. Khomeriki, minister of agriculture and
Sh. Alexi- Meskhishvili, minister of law of Georgia, and R. Kakuba, G.
Tumanov, V. Gurjua and G. Ajamov of Abkhazia.
By this agreement the government of Georgia granted Abkhazia an
extensive autonomy and promised economic and military assistance. A
detachment of the Georgian National Guard was sent to help the Abkhaz
People's Council in pursue of clause 4 of the agreement of June 1918.
Meanwhile, the situation in Abkhazia was aggravated by Bolshevist - and then Turkish- oriented forces. In Sukhumi Eshba organized a military-revolutionary committee of Bolsheviks. Taking an opportunity of the hard situation in Transcaucasia, in particular, Georgia, the Sukhumi Bolsheviks decided to get Sukhumi district joined to Soviet Russia with the further purpose to draw Georgia into the sphere of Bolshevist influences. With this in view the military-revolutionary committee of Sukhumi applied to the Bolsheviks of Ekaterinodar (now Krasnodar - A. M.) asking them to join Sukhumi district to the Black Sea - Kuban Soviet Republic and to send the Red Army forces in order to continue attacking Georgia.
With the same purpose Eshba went to Sochi and suggested the Sochi
Soviet (council) of worker and peasant deputies to support the Sukhumi
committee in the struggle against the "counterrevolutionary" government
of Georgia (*18). The Sochi soviet declined
Eshba's proposal and decided not to fight against anyone and only to
fight back in case of an attack (*19).
In response to the request of the APC concerning support in the struggle
against Bolsheviks and pre-Turkish elements and maintenance of order,
the Georgian government sent its troops to Sukhumi. Early in July the
Georgian Guard and army detachments entered the town. The Bolsheviks
withdrew into Sochi district (*20). They
sent a delegation to Maikop asking for Red Army troops to attack
Sukhumi. A detachment of 2000 men helped the Bolsheviks to seise the
town of Gudauta and the Georgian troops had to retire to Sukhumi
suffering heavy losses in bloody battles. Echelons of Georgian troops
arrived in Sukhumi on 18 and 19 June; they started an offensive on 20
June and after a fierce battle occupied Novy Afon.
On 22 June the Georgian troops occupied Gudauta, and on 28 June,
entered Gagra. They kept advancing towards Sochi. Meanwhile, in the
night of 28 June Turkish troops (about 800 men) lead by A. Shervashidze
landed near the r. Kodori, south of Sukhumi.
The Abkhaz People's Council made a vigorous protest against that
operation. The Georgian government supported that protest and applied to
the representative of Germany in Georgia, urging him to take all the
possible measures "to eliminate such cases as they may cause quite
undesirable consequences" (*21).
In the meantime General G. Mazniashvili managed to occupy favorable
positions that guarded access to Sukhumi on the right bank of the
Kodori. The Turks were unable to get into Sukhumi and their troops were
driven out.
On 6 July the Georgian troops occupied Sochi and pushed the Bolsheviks
up to the north. Twenty days later General G. Mazniashvili's detachment
approached Tuapse and after a 12-hour long bitter battle occupied the
town (*22).
Both the Georgian government and General Mazniashvili used to announce more than once that all the movements of the Georgian troops outside the Republic were never and by no means aimed at any expansion of its territory; they pursued purely military- strategic aims and were caused jy an urgency to secure the country against Bolshevist nliacks (*23).
As the civil war began on the Don and Kuban, the While Guard grew
active and started frequent interferences In the interior affairs of the
Democratic Republic of Georgia. One of its claims was to separate Gagra
district from Abkhazia and join it to Kuban.
On 25 September, 1918, when representatives of the Georgian Republic,
Kuban territorial government and Volunteer Army met, General Alexeev
pointed out that Gagra district was "purely Russian" just like Sochi
district and ought to become a part of Kuban. Then he said to E.
Gegechkori, a representative of Georgia: "The borderline that was set in
1905 must be preserved, and this is the only compulsory condition that
may help us to a mutual understanding" (*24).
This demand was supported by the representatives of the Kuban district
Bych and Vorobyov. The latter cynically announced that there are no
evidences, "either ethnographic, or historic supporting belonging of
Gagra district to Transcaucasia", (*25) as
if there were any historic or other evidences supporting its belonging
to Russia. Than Vorobyov continued: "Georgia must set its borders behind
Abkhazia whose aspiration for independence can't be ignored only because
several hundreds of Georgians live there." The agricultural statistics
for 1917 shows that the population of Abkhazia consisted of 74,846
Georgians (42,1 %), 38,121 Abkhaz (21.4%), 20,893 Russians (11.7%),
20,673 Greeks (11.7%), 18,219 Armenians (10.2%) and 5,087 of other
nationalities (2.9%) (*26).
This cynical distortion of facts was made by the White Guard
politicians in the name of "united and indivisible Russia."
The very N. Vorobyov published a book of fraud in 1919; he entitled it
"On the Groundless Claims of Georgians for Sukhumi District (Abkhazia)"
and revealed his absolute incompetency in the matters of the Georgian
and Abkhazian history. He interpreted the events of 1918-early 1919 as
Georgia's attempt to "swallow up the people of Abkhazia that is
absolutely no relation to the Georgians". Only complete ignorance and
deliberate wish to distort the history could lead the author to such a
conclusion. Unfortunately, some Abkhazian separatists of today have
taken up that fraud.
Relationships between the Georgian and Abkhaz peoples are described
in a memorandum of deputies of Abkhazian and Samurzakan nobility
submitted on 23 March 1870 to the Chairman of Tiflis Council of
social-estate affairs, adjutant-general prince Svyatopolk- Mirski. The
Memorandum was written by lieutenant prince B. Emukhvari, prince M.
Marshani, Lieutenant T. Margani, prince K.Inal-Ipa.
The principal goal of the Memorandum was to describe the way of life of
the Abkhaz people for further correct solution of the social-estate
question in the region. It explained that the ruling circles of
Abkhazian enjoyed the same privileges as the Georgian nobility,
therefore, the agrarian reform there ought to be carried out in the same
way as in Georgia. The authors of the Memorandum referred to the
historic background of the two peoples. "From time immemorial Abkhazia
has been a part of the former Georgian Kingdom.
The old Pitsunda Cathedral used to be the seat of Catholicoses of
Abkhazia and Georgia. The bishoprics of Dranda, Mkva and Bedi were
flourishing in very recent times. The Bedi temple which was built by
Bagrat, the first Georgian king of an Abkhazian dynasty, is the resting
place of its majestic builder. The temple of Mokva was built by the
Georgian and Abkhazian King David, the Restorer. Till nearly recent
times the people of Abkhazia and Samurzakan used to exercise the same
religion, customs find laws as those of Georgia, Samegrelo and Imereti.
Even though Christianity was considerably weakened in Abkhazia under the
influence of the Moslem yoke and various commotions, its traces have
certainly been preserved In the life of the Abkhaz people, who kept
celebrating main Christian holidays and, as tradition goes, used to give
presents of lambs and painted eggs on the day of Blessed Insurrection.
Out of a great number of Abkhazian landowners who separated from Georgia
when the latter was divided into appanages, only two were Moslems:
Zurab-Bei who had been expatriated to Turkey when he was a boy, and his
heir Kelesh Akhmet-Bei who was born and bred in Turkey. All the others
were Christians. Georgian kings never excluded Abkhazia from the
Georgian family, and always, both before and after the division of the
country, they bore the title of the King of Georgia, Kartli, Abkhazia,
Imereti and Kakheti. When Georgian King Vakhtang VI began working out
laws, he would call representatives of all the parts of the Georgian
Kingdom to help him in the work, and among them, deputies of the Abkhaz
people who had preserved the oldest Georgian customs. No less important
witnesses than Christian temples, proving that Abkhazia belonged to
Georgia are ruins of various civil and military buildings. The
well-known towers over the Psyrasta Gorge are said to have been built by
the glorious Georgian Queen Tamar, ...castles in the villages of
Yashtuhza, Otsertsy and many others look exactly like castles of
Samegrelo (Mingrelia).
We beg Your Excellency to notice that both in the past and at present
the dwellings, clothing, food, farming tools, agricultural methods are
absolutely alike in Abkhazia and Samegrelo.
Most of the place-names are Georgian; most of the inhabitants admit
their Mingrelian or Georgian origin and have even kept their Georgian
and Mingrelian family names. It is only the language that might be
regarded as a proof evidencing that Abkhazia is different from Georgia;
however, even there we find a half of Mingrelian and Georgian words,
strongly altered, though, but clearly showing traces of original
Mingrelian or Georgian roots (*).
The whole Abkhaz people was ruled by the lord of Abkhazia
Shervashidze, a descendant of an old Georgian family. The lord, just as
all the Georgian mtavari (heads, lords) who became independent after the
division of the Kingdom, exercised the supreme, political and civil rule
over the whole Abkhaz People."
In conclusion the Abkhaz deputation expressed a hope that "we shall not
be excluded from the family of Georgians in the agrarian reform of
Abkhazia and Samurzakani, as we have always belonged to them. We dare to
expect that we shall enjoy those regulations that His Majesty the
Emperor has nobly set for the other parts of the former Georgian
Kingdom, and we shall not be excluded" (*27).
The deputies elected by all the social groups of the Abkhaz people (*28)
considered Abkhazia as a historically inseparable part of the Georgian
state. However, the authors of the Memorandum made an unfortunate
mistake representating Georgians, Mingrelians and Imeretians as
different nationalities which is an utmost scientific blunder.
The Kuban government and Volunteer Army representatives while reasoning
why Gagra district ought to be annexed, stated that "the whole district
was built owing to the efforts of Prince of Oldenburg, and about
10,000,000 roubles of the old currency were spent only on Gagra (*29).
Presently, the Volunteer Army began to act, Early in 1918 they
instigated a coup in Abkhazia under the guidance of the district
Commissar Margania and Colonel Chkhotua, Minister of Abkhazian affairs.
The attempt failed; six members of the Abkhaz People's Council who
"acted in the interests of landowners, Turkey and General Alexeev" (*30),
were arrested.
On 1; October 1918 N. Zhordania, head of the Georgian government made a
report on the events in Abkhazia, and the governments adopted the
following resolution:
"Taking into consideration that 1) some of the members of the Abkhaz
People's Council, mainly of the landowners class, having taken the path
of treachery of the Abkhaz people and the whole population of Sukhumi
district in (heir personal estate interests, always let foreign powers,
first Turks, then Alexeev's forces, interfere with the affairs of the
Abkhaz people and the whole state and have now surrounded the residence
of the People's Council; 2) the Abkhaz People's Council being threatened
by the traitors is deprived of the possibility to work for the people's
welfare; 3) the members of the Abkhaz People's Council hadn't been
elected by regulations that secured true expression of the Sukhumi
district population, the Government resolves:
1) To declare the current Abkhaz People's Council dissolved and assign
new elections based on general suffrage;
2) To assign the Central Election Committee consisting of Varlam
Shervashidze, Isidor Ramishvili, Vasili Gurjua .. (name illegible - A.
M.) and Giorgi Shanshiev and Authorize the Committee to elect a Chairman
and co-opt the necessary people;
3) To assign Benia Chkhikvishvili Commissar of Sukhumi district until
the People's Council is elected; before he arrives, Chief of Staff of
the Sukhumi detachment Tukhareli will exorcise the supreme military and
civil power;
4) To consider the authority of Colonel Chkhotua, Minister of Affairs of
Abkhazia, as exhausted due to the dismissal of the Abkhaz People's
Council" (*31).
Majority of the Abkhaz People's Council were landowners, (*32)
and it was but natural, that their attitude towards the
social-democratic government of Georgia was far from "friendly", since
the social and political reforms effected the interests of the
propertied class, in particular, of pro-Turkish landowners.
The destabilization in the region caused social tension. The measures
aimed at protection of order and territorial integrity of Georgia called
for undesirable requisitions among the population giving rise to general
discontent. The Abkhaz People's Council addressed the government of
Georgia, and on 3 September 1918 a session of the Georgian government
discussed the actions of the Georgian troops in Abkhazia. The government
made the following decision: in addition to the measures taken by the
war minister (a) to send immediately a special emergency commission of
representatives from the Ministries of war, justice and interior
affairs; (b) to authorize the Commission (1) to investigate with three
representatives of the People's Council all the points mentioned in the
Abkhazian complaint about the actions of our troops; (2) to assess the
losses incurred by the local population. To bring this resolution
urgently to the Abkhaz People's Council's knowledge" (*33).
Great damages in the Kodori area were incurred there by the Turkish
troops supported by the propertied classes. A general meeting of the
Kodori area population gathered in the village of Mokva to viscuss the
problems concerning the Turkish expedition and named those who were
involved in those events. They were Tatish Marshania, Alexander
Shervashidze, Sv. Tumanov, Titush Marshania, Mikhail Anchabadze,
Constantin Anchabadze, Colonel M. Shervashidze, Hadij Ashvibaya and
others. The meeting demanded to expel them from Sukhumi district (*34).
On 17 December, 1918, Minister of Abkhazian affairs made a report to the
government, which was followed by the following resolution:
a) To adopt draft regulations of elections to the Abkhaz People's
Council, amended subject to government's resolution of 10 December, and
present it to the Parliament; to carry out elections of local councils
"zemstvo" based on the same regulations; to allot 75,000 out of
10,000,000 fund for the elections;
b) To publish a government address pointing out that Abkhazia is granted
the right of public representation and, consequently, settlement of
internal problems on autonomous principle;
c) To return to the self-government of Sukhumi the horses and supplies
that had been reqcisited by various staffs and detachments as a debt of
100,000 roubles, all the other matters to be investigated by an
emergency commission;
d) To allot 100,000 roubles from the Ministry's credit on repair roads
and bridges in Sukhumi;
e) to present the investigation results on the damage caused by our
troops in the Kodori area to the Ministry of Justice for study" (*35).
In this way the government of Georgia confirmed once more Abkhazia's
right of internal self-government and made certain steps towards
compensation of the damage incurred by the civil population as a result
of military actions carried out against the Turkish askers and
Bolshevist troops of Krasnodar.
The authorities of the Volunteer Army turned to the English for
assistance in setting, their supporters free. The English troops entered
Baku in the November of 1918, and on 5 December Commander of the allied
troops General Thomson wrote a letter to the Georgian Representative in
Baku, Alshibaya, demanding immediate release of the arrested members of
the Abkhaz People's Council who, as he put it, had been arrested
unlawfully without any charge (*36).
Alshibaya answered Thomson that "the arrested have been in prison for 6 weeks and not 7 months and on the ground of a full and comprehensive investigation that has proved them to be state criminals belonging either to Bolsheviks or Turkophiles. Subject to an agreement with Abkhazia the latter is granted the right of full internal self-government and the Abkhaz People's Council is granted full power. The Abkhaz People's Council would have protected those people if they had not deserved the punishment. But not a single protest of complaint has been yet submitted to the Georgian government" (*37). On 6 December, Colonel Stocks, head of political department of the allied mission, Alshibaya and Colonel Marganidze had a talk part of which is cited below:
"Alshibaya: Your demand of 5 December concerning an immediate
release of the members of the Abkhaz People's Council was telegraphed to
our government. I consider it my duty to explain to you Colonel, that
those men were arrested by the Georgian government on the state treason
charges.
Stocks: You can't let people languish in prison for 5 months
without charges.
Alshibaya: Colonel, they were arrested only 6 weeks ago and they
are still under investigation.
Stocks: Six weeks were enough to finish the investigation.
Alshibaya: They are charged for state treason, organization of an
upraise. The investigation is complicated: it is not easy to collect and
check the evidence.
Stocks: Where are they kept?
Alshibaya: In Tiflis, in the Metekhi Castle, a political prison.
Stocks: Why so severe?
Alshibaya: Colonel, they are accused of state treason. The
government couldn't help punishing them severely. One of those men
belongs to the Bolsheviks, another is one of Abkhazian Turkophiles who
tried to organize the landing of Turkish troops in Abkhazia 4 months
ago.
Stocks: You are keeping Abkhazians in prison without any charges
against them, and we can't tolerate it.
Alshibaya: We have the best possible relations with Abkhazia,
Colonel Marganadze can confirm it, he is our military representative at
the diplomatic representation.
Marganadze: I am an Abkhaz and serve the Georgian government. I
assure you that there are no bad feelings between Georgia and Abkhazia.
According to an agreement, Georgia has granted full internal
self-government to Abkhazia. The Abkhaz People's Council controls all
the interior affairs of .Abkhazia. It is never the Abkhaz people but
only some individuals that may oppose the Georgian government.
Alshibaya: You are turning against those who aren't worth your
protection. The fate of the prisoners should worry the Abkhaz People's
Council more than anyone else, but the Council hasn't made any
statements defending the prisoners because they don't deserve it.
Stocks: I think they ought to be released from prison, and held
in Tiflis until our representative arrives to investigate into the
matter.
Alshibaya: Sir, it is impossible. Such a demand of yours will
decrease the prestige of our government. This will be known to the
public. People will learn that you have interfered, made us release
persons accused of state treason.
Stocks: No one will know it. We will not tell anyone about it and
you should keep it secret.
Alshibaya: No, Colonel, it is impermissible.
Stocks: Can't they, at least, be held under domiciliary arrest,
until our delegation arrives in Tiflis?
Alshibaya: This is impermissible too, Colonel. If you care fur
order and quietness in Georgia, you mustn't decrease the prestige of our
rule by such an interference. It is only six mouth that Georgia has
declared its independence, but we have managed to organize and adjust
the state control mechanism. We have complete order; our people are
enjoying all the civil rights. We are sure we will manage to maintain
this order and strengthen our statehood by ourselves. We hope that the
allies will help us in this.
Stocks: All right. I'll give a report on our talk to General
Thomson, maybe he will cancel his proposal..." (*38).
The above material evidences that Denikin and his supporters supplied
the British command with false, one-sided Information on the actions of
the Georgian government wild its relations with Abkhazia trying to prove
Georgia's aggressiveness and, consequently, to start realizing their
plans of annexation of Abkhazia and Georgia in order to restore "united
and indivisible Russia". The Volunteer Army command were trying to take
an opportunity of the British "hostility" towards the Georgian
government which has asked Germans, the enemies of British, to come to
this country in the May of 1918. In this way the Volunteer Army's
representatives tried to intensity its intervention in the Internal
affairs of Georgia, using the opportunity of the British force entry in
Caucasian late in 1918.
Early in 1918 General Denikin's troops began advancing in the district of Gagra, trying to push the Georgians back to the Bzyb. His plans of seizing, the whole of Abkhazia and annex it from Georgia are clearly visible from the following minutes of a conference of E. Gegechkori, N, Ramishvili and British General Briggs who met on May 23, 1919.
"E. Gegechkori: You are welcome, General, as a representative
of the British command, and your arrival is particularly encouraging as
its purpose is to help us in settling our misunderstanding with the
Volunteer Army.
I am to remind you that last year we had a meeting with General Alexeev.
The Volunteer Army was weak then, nevertheless our attitude to it hasn't
changed. The Georgian government, having no intentions to interfere with
the purely Russian affairs, finds no reason for armed conflicts with the
Volunteer Army. The only question of importance that has caused the
misunderstanding between us, is the question of the strategic state
border which could guarantee us against any infringements. This border
is the r. Mekhadyr. Solution of this question would be very important
for Denikin as well, because it would make his army's rear safe from
this side. Such was our standpoint last year, such is it now, and our
attitude towards the Volunteer Army hasn't changed. This was clear from
our negotiations with Alexeev last year, and I insist that there are no
other divergences with the Volunteer Army, and if we leave aside our
personal feelings and take a realistic stand, this boundary problem
could be solved in a way beneficial for both sides.
General Briggs: Yesterday I gave you a detailed report, on
General Denikin's viewpoints; as far as I understand now, you insist on
remaining on the Mekhadyr. I have already told you why Denikin insists
on restoring the former position: it is the evil behavior of the
Georgian troops in Sochi and Sukhumi population's discontent with the
Georgian rule; complaints are numerous. Abkhazians are displeased with
the Georgian rule and even declare that should they be given arms, they
would clear the district of-the Georgian troops. Denikin could not
remain indifferent to those complaints, and if you still insist on
remaining on the Mekhadyr, I'm afraid, my visit here seems to be
pointless.
E. Gegechkori: Both the British Headquarters and we receive as
many complaints about the Volunteers in Sochi. Of course, if one
believes everything that is told about us one can't help feeling
indignant; but I think one can't trust all those complaints without
checking them. I insist that the Georgian government never took away a
smallest piece of land from anyone in Sochi, never carried on either
socialization or nationalization. These rumours are spread by our
enemies and not to be trusted.
As far as Sukhumi district is concerned, we'd rather avoid mentioning
this subject, as it may cause misunderstanding in our talks. But, as
soon as you have touched upon this question, sir, allow me to say that
Abkhazia is being governed quite independently by the Abkhaz People's
Council elected by general suffrage; and if the information on the
Abkhaz people's discontent is supplied by such persons as Alexander
Shervashidze who let the Turkish troops landing in Sukhumi district last
year and is residing in Ekaterinodar now, how can one believe anything
what those persons tell?
I have heard a reproach that we behave worse than Bolsheviks. I can't
see what may the reason of such a statement be, but I can assure you
that Russian officers found security here, in Georgia, in the time of
wild mob laws and savage reprisals over officers throughout the whole of
Russia. It was only here, in Georgia, that not a single Russian officer
suffered from violence, only here they were able to survive and escape
from persecutions to which they were subject over former Russia. I feel
proud to say that history will record this services of Georgia for
Russia.
Gen. Briggs: General Denikin is a temporary head of the Army
restoring Russia and is unable to permit immediate solution of the
boundary problems. This is up to the Russian People's Assembly. As for
Sukhumi district, I have heard that the desire to join Georgia is not an
expression of the population's will. If the Abkhaz representatives in
the Russian People's Assembly declare that they wish to remain with
Georgia, the will of the people shall have to be fulfilled now that
democracy has triumphed, and democratically minded Denikin won't object
to it. However, now Denikin wants to secure his rear and will agree to
have Sukhumi district made a neutral zone, but he will not talk until
the Georgians have withdrawn beyond the Bzyb.
E. Gegechkori: Last year our talks with Gen. Alexeev in
Ekaterinodar, concerned only Sochi district, and now, judging from your
report, the Volunteer's claims have extended into Sukhumi district. I
have already mentioned the will of the Abkhaz people expressed by the
Abkhaz People's Council elected by 99% of the voters, and I can't see
why you would believe some source and wouldn't believe others.
Gen. Briggs: I am a stranger here and a disinterested one and I
suppose that a neutral commission should investigate the matter and
confirm the real wish of the people.
N. Ramishvili: The democratic principles you've mentioned,
general, are the very guidelines that the Georgian government is
following in all its deeds. Our advance in Sukhumi district was aimed at
the struggle against Bolshevism. In the 200,000 population of the
district Georgians (60,000) and Abkhazians constitute majority. And this
population announced its will through the elections of the People's
Council which proved that the people wish to get autonomous government
with independent Georgia. And the autonomous government is in effect
there now maintained by the whole of the population; therefore, we
insist on preserving the strategic borderline along the r. Makhadyr
which is the historic border of Abkhazia. This is the only reasonable
treatment of the border question, until its final solution at Paris
Conference. And it must be the Conference but not the Russian
Constitutional Assembly.
Gen. Briggs: Since the majority of the Sukhumi district
populations are Georgians you should not worry about any investigations
by an Allied Commission. If the latter finds that the population is for
Georgia, Denikin will not oppose to it provided that the Russian
property are secured and his conditions concerning the borders are
observed. Soon Kolchak and Denikin will join together to have the
All-Russian Government formed, and is a matter of some weeks. The
British and Italians are sure to leave but Russia will stay, so you'd
better be friendly with it, and I'd advise you, if only you would accept
my advice, to forget your pride and offer Denikin a hand and say "We are
with you", Small countries are too weak to survive in hostility; they
must join. A separate financial system leads to bankruptcy, as you may
see, same everything else does.
N. Ramishvili: Sovereignty and independence are the wish of our
Government as well as of all Georgian people, and we are sure that all
the great powers will support us. Britain has formally promised to
support us in the cause of recognition of our independence.
Gen. Briggs: You mean independence from Russia, don't you?
N. Ramishvili: Yes, I do. We are not going to get isolated. On
the contrary, we wish to cooperate with the Great Powers, join to their
culture, and if the democratic intentions of Kolchak and Denikin are
really honest ones, they can't neglect the wish of the Georgian people;
however, the question of the borders has to be solved at the Peace
Conference.
Gen. Briggs: This question won't be set at Paris Conference
altogether. It is subject to solution by the Russian Government. A small
nation like Georgia shouldn't aspire for independence, since small
states suffer from commercial wars and I think you are preparing not
very pleasant old days for yourself.
E. Gegechkori: We are grateful to you for your advice but no one
knows what awaits us in future. I'm still saying earnestly and honestly,
that we wish to see Russia a great and powerful country: this is our
sincere desire, but we also wish every people could settle its own life.
Our right for Independence can't possibly depend on the Volunteer Army
command, and we hope this question shall be solved favorably for us in
Paris. As far as our future relations with Russia are concerned, we
believe that should real democracy triumph there, it would never act
against wishes of smaller nations, because it would be an act of
violence. Besides, we are stunned to hear that a British General should
express such an attitude to our rights; it is completely different from
what we have from our allies. We wonder whether those statements of
yours reflect the standpoint of the British command and government or
General Denikin's?
Gen. Briggs: I'm speaking as a representative of General Denikin
and not the British government. You were talking about the future of
Georgia, and I have to inform you that Denikin is for autonomy of small
nations and far reunion of Russia, since this means power.
E. Gegechkori: And who is supposed to settle this problem in case
we think differently? To our mind, it should be the Paris Conference.
Our international status isn't quite clear yet and we are awaiting for
settlement of the problem.
Gen. Briggs: But Russia is going to be formed up soon, and you
shouldn't have declared independence so hurriedly.
E. Gegechkori: Allow me to ask you, sir: Do we have the right to
declare our wishes in the cause of settling our own destiny?
Gen. Briggs: I can see that all our talk is being recorded on two
sides.
E. Gegechkori: We are talking frankly and there's nothing to
conceal, so I ask you if we have the right to utter our wishes.
Gen. Briggs: You certainly have.
E. Gegechkori: That's what we did, and now we are waiting for the
Conference to make a decision. Now, speaking of an agreement with
Denikin, I have to set forth our conditions: 1) We remain on the
Mekhadyr; there may be a neutral zone between us; 2) We guarantee safety
of the Russian property and revive trade relations; 3) The question of
the border is to be solved at the Conference in Paris. That's all. And
what would Denikin offer?
Gen. Briggs: General Denikin's conditions are as follows: 1. You
must withdraw beyond the Bzyb; 2. Sukhumi district may temporarily
remain under the Georgian rule, provided you guarantee safety of the
Russian property both in Sukhumi district and all over Georgia; 3. Land
can; be taken away if the population wishes so, but for fair; payment.
N. Ramishvili: I suppose, General, you are not quite; well
informed on Denikin's intentions. He would object to the independence of
Poland and Finland, but our case is much clearer: Georgia had existed as
an independent country for 2,000 years.
Gen. Briggs: - As an independent country?
N. Ramishvili: Yes, indeed. In 1801 it voluntarily joined Russia
on terms of autonomy and protectorate. But Russia did not observe the
terms causing a protest of the (18) 56 Congress, and Britain was among
those who protested. This is our past story in a nutshell. As far as our
attitude to Russia, I declare that we are not against Great Russia, but
then the Volunteer Army ought not to be against us. Speaking of
recognition of our independence, we are waiting for the Conference and
rightfully hope it will fulfill our desires. We'd like to come to a
peaceful agreement with the Volunteers and assume responsibility for any
consequences of a different solution of the question.
Gen. Briggs: And still, Denikin does not think he has any right
to settle the question of the borders.
E. Gegechkori: Isn't Denikin's proclamation and interference into
matters subject to consideration at the Peace Conference?
Gen. Briggs: You also have advanced without waiting for the
settlement of the question of the borders.
E. Gegechkori: And do you know, General, that we have advanced
with a consent of the British command who were aware of the reasons of
our advance. And do you know that the British command suggested Denikin
long ago to mop-up Sochi and the British command has formally secured
our safety and inviolability against the Volunteers?
Gen. Briggs: I see that we are back again to where we started and
suppose that my mission hasn't succeeded. I believe, I've wasted my
efforts and my time.
E. Gegechkori: I must say frankly that we most sincerely wished
to come to a peaceful solution and express my utmost regret that we have
failed to come to an agreement" (*39).
The reasons why the Georgian government was trying to establish the state boundary along the r. Mekhadyr were clarified at the Paris Conference by General I. Odishelidze, a military expert in the Georgian delegation, I. Odishelidze and I. Javakhishvili, an outstanding Georgian historian, had been charged to compile historic, ethnographic and military-strategic provisions for the future boundaries of Georgia with the purpose to present them at the Peace Conference in Paris. On May 1, 1919 General I. Odishelidze made a report on the boundaries of Georgia on the Black Sea northern shores.
"Nature itself has outlined the boundaries of Georgia and history has confirmed them. The Northern border ran along the Main Caucasian Range beyond which the Georgian population rarely crossed. Almost throughout the whole 3-4 thousand-year old history of the state of Georgia, up to its voluntary joining to Russia, the Main Caucasian Range with its peaks Chura, Donguz-Orun-Bashi (south of Elbrus) , Adai-Hoh, Arhon, Kazbek, Kamatsana-Dag, has been a natural barrier which had never been crossed from either side. It was so only along that part of the Range which is still wild and inaccessible; however, near the Black Sea shore where it didn't stand in the way, Georgian lands spread north-westward where the Main Range .is getting less inaccessible and gradually vanishes northward. In the age of integration and prosperity of Georgia in the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries, the Georgian boundaries near the Black Sea were stretching beyond Anapa and reaching the r. Kuban mouth. Later, in the 14th century the boundary shifted back to the r. Makopse, and from the 15th to the 19th centuries, i.e. up to the joining of this part of Georgia to Russia, the boundary went along the r. Makopse (south of Tuapse), It is quite unambiguously shown in the book of geography written by Prince Vakhushti, the son of King Vakhtang VI, and moreover, in a map of Georgia drawn by an impartial witness, the Russian envoy Burnashev. And we must stop at this river too because it is right here that the Main Caucasian Range is still inaccessible protecting Georgia in the North and because it is here that the Range comes close to the Black Sea providing Georgia with a narrow coastal defile that can be used for easier and safer protection of Georgia from enemies from the north-west moving along the coast. This is supported by numerous facts from the long history of Georgia and the most recent struggle against Bolsheviks.
These geographical and military considerations indicating the rightfulness of setting the boundary along the r. Makopse, are supported by Georgia's historic rights: Abkhazia had always been within Georgia leading common state life, with common past history since these nations are closely related; in the course of 600 years, from the 9th to 15th century the titles of the Georgian kings began with the title of the "King of Abkhazia"; from the 15th till 19th century that title belonged to one of the Georgian kings, mainly, Imeretian King. This closeness and integrity of the two countries was so natural that foreign historians and generally foreigners used to refer to the Georgian Kings as Abkhazian kings, to make it shorter, as it was done, for instance, by Arab historians Tabari, Masudi and others. Finally, the people of Abkhazia so much mixed now with Georgians, have confirmed, through the latest resolution of its National Assembly, its determination to keep forever more than millennium-old connections and integrity with Georgia. And the boundary of Abkhazia stretched as far as the Kuban mouth for 300 years, and for 200 years it ran far north-west of the r. Makopse with Tuapse being in Georgia; then, for over 300 years, from the 15th till 19th century, the r. Makopse served as the north-west borderline. Thus, the whole band of land between the Black Sea and the Main Caucasian Range from Gagra defile to the Makopse mouth (i.e. Sochi district), has always been within Georgia joined Russia voluntarily due to the historic circumstances.
It is therefore clear that the future boundary of Georgia must follow
the 15-19th century line beginning at the r. Makopse mouth up to its
source to the peak named Greater Psheushe, then run along to divide
between the rr. Tuapse and Ashe up to the Main Caucasian Range (up to
the point at 20 verstas distance south-east of Goitkhe pass). From this
point the boundary will follow the north border of the former Black-Sea
district, i.e. along the Main Caucasian Range up to mountain 9889. The
whole area delimited by this boundary will make up the present Sochi
district for which Georgia has a right from the ethnic viewpoint:
according to a Russian explorer, General A. N. Kuzmin-Karavayev, the
Russian population of Sochi district composed only 1/7 part of the total
population.
The following data are quoted from Kuzmin-Karavayev's book:
Place |
Total Number |
Nationalities |
|||
Russians | Georgians | Shapsugs | Other Nationalities | ||
Town Sochi |
460 |
11 |
440 |
-- |
9 |
Sochi district |
5811 |
805 |
836 |
731 |
3439 |
It follows then that Sochi which was and still is a purely Georgian town, had only 11 Russian inhabitants, and they were greatly outnumbered in the district by Georgians Shapsugs [related to Abkhazians), i.e. nationalities who could be considered as the hosts and the only rightful claimants for Sochi district. The rest of the population is made up from 11 nationalities - strangers in these places: Germans, Letts, Ests, Armenians, Greeks and Others. One should expect that they can't have any right to play the hosts and managers in the district...
The number of Russians in Sochi district went up after 1894; nevertheless, 22% were Georgians. The growth of the Russian population was due to an inhuman policy of the Russian government which the very General Kuzmin-Karavayev described in his book "The Black Sea District", page 2: "Our struggle with the inhabitants of Western Caucasian has acquired an extreme unprecedented character: the decision was not only to conquer the country but to subdue its inhabitants and to drive them away". The writer compared that behavior of the Russians with the most ancient people, "when whole nations used to be enslaved, just as it happened to the Jews, for instance..." These words could be confirmed by a Russian law issued in the time of Minister of agriculture Ermolov and prohibiting Georgians to settle in that ancient Georgian land and buy plots there. The selfsame law granted free land lots to Russian officials and generals who are now demanding from Denikin not to return those truly Georgian lands to the Georgians who have fought Sochi district back from Bolsheviks and who still constitute 22% in the district (not to mention their related Abkhazians and Shapsugs).
Before these fair demands are satisfied by the Paris Conference and in order to avoid further bloodshed with the Volunteer Army which is kept back by Georgians beyond the r. Mekhadyr, temporary state boundary of Georgia ought to be drawn along that river, from the mouth up to the source, then along the divide between the rr. Mekhadyr, Khashupsa and Gega (in the South) and r. Psou in the North), following along the Katsyrkha Range through peaks 8498 (South of Ah-ag), 7077 and 8470, Mount Apesta (0.699) past the Apesta glacier and Lake Mzi, across Ahuk-Dara or Sukhumi Pass and up to peak 9889 in the Main Caucasian Range.
In this way Georgians will justly have the area of Gagra which had been part of Kutaisi Gubernia, i.e. Georgia, until 1904 and the prohibiting laws. But a certain temporary fixation of the boundary is mainly due to the military and political considerations: Georgians will control the Gagra Defile and Gagra Range which is, as Kuzmin- Karavayev put it, "a serious defense line, a strong wall". And it should be added, that the Gagra Range is wild, inaccessible, almost without any passes, butting against the .sea, as at the Mekhadyr mouth. And here is the Gagra fortress closing the Gagra Defile from the north, that Defile being the only accessible passage suitable for movement of military forces for Georgia. Since there is no one who could predict the result of struggle between the Volunteer Army of General Denikin and Bolsheviks who may soon become Georgian's neighbors, it is in the vital interests of the Georgian Republic to have the Gagra Defile and the Gagra Range with all their north and south slopes. On the other hand, it is equally dangerous to have the Volunteer Army as neighbors because of their reactionary, integratory and aggressive ideals which do not agree with the democratic and defensive ideals of Georgians: they may soon have to start a defensive struggle for their territory and freedom. For this case, the position on the r. Mekhadyr, the Gagra Range and the Gagra Defile will do an invaluable favor to Georgia" (*40).
Owing to the complicated political and military and strategic
situation at the north-west borders of the Republic resulting from the
Volunteer's aggressive actions, the Georgian government and General
Headquarters found it strategically necessary that the state border of
Georgia should go along the r. Mekhadyr before the question was solved
by the Conference in Paris.
General Denikin's aggressive actions against Georgia continued; the
menace of seizure of Transcaucasia by the Volunteer Army remained real.
With this in view, the government of Georgia concluded a
military-defensive alliance with Azerbaijan on June 16, 1919. Some
measures were taken on the international arena aimed at drawing the
attention of Europe to Denikin's aggression against Georgia. On June 14,
1919, Head of the Georgian delegation at the Paris Conference N.
Chkhenkeli addressed the Chairman and the delegations of the USA, Great
British, Italy and Japan with a letter in which he wrote "that the
attitude of the Russian Volunteer Army led by General Denikin to the
Georgian Republic is growing more threatening. This General who is
encouraged, supported and supplied by the allied powers in his struggle
against Bolsheviks, provokes a border conflict with Georgia, demanding
that the Georgian troops should evacuate the space between the rr.
Mekhadyr and Bzyb on the Black Sea shore.
The territory claimed by him is a part of Abkhazia which was joined to
Georgia by popular vote and is governed by the People's Council of
Abkhazia elected by popular vote too.
Under these circumstances General Denikins actions with arms and
amunition suppled to him by the Great Powers are an obvious divergence
from the goal for which the Great Powers are helping the Volunteer
Army".
In conclusion N. Chkhenkeli asked the government of the Great Powers "to
order the Russian Volunteer Army to show respect to the borders which
Georgia actually held between the Caucasian Range and the Black Sea,
subject to its rights and its people's will and consent of the Allied
command" (*41).
In June representatives of Estonia, Latvia, North Caucasian Republic, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania and Poland sent a note of protest against Denikin's aggressive actions. It said: "All the representatives of the states in the outlying district of Russia protest unanimously together with representatives of Georgia and North-Caucasian Republic and other Caucasian states against that invasion. They wish to point out herewith that they are clearly conscious of the solidarity uniting all the nations from the outlying districts of Russia and each of them is well aware of any threat directed against the independence of any other of them as if it were directed against his own independence...
Therefore, the undersigned representatives bring this protest to the knowledge of the governments of the Allied and friendly powers. They are asking the latter to make General Denikin immediately cease his aggression against the Georgian and Azerbaijan Republic... They are asking for all the necessary measures to be taken to oblige General Denikin to observe all the laws of international justice" (*42). It is obvious that the Georgian government made active steps at an international level to stop Denikin's aggression.
The notes of the Georgian government more than once emphasized the
fact of autonomy of Abkhazia within Georgia and the inviolability of the
historical borders of Georgia. By protecting the territorial integrity
of Georgia its government defended Abkhazia against the encroachments of
the White Guard generals.
It should be noted that the problems of Transcaucasional borders were
not the only ones submitted to the Supreme Council of the Entente.
In 1920 in Abkhazia arose a question of free, so-called, "fund lands" (*43). According to G. Dzidzaria, an Abkhaz historian, "the Menshevik government intended to use them at their own discretion", while representative of opposition in the People's Council of Abkhazia proposed to assign these lauds to the mahajirs. Debates started" (*44).
In June of 1920 the Abkhaz intelligentsia called a meeting and
created "Sukhumi Central Committee on the Affairs of Abkhaz-Mahajirs".
The meeting concluded that the Abkhaz- Mahajirs who lived in Turkey had
been expatriated from Abkhazia against their will during the
Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78.
The Committee published a letter to the people of Abkhazia telling them
that the Abkhaz- Mahajirs had applied to the Georgian government for the
permission to return to their mother-land, Abkhazia, but, as G.
Dzidzaria put it, "the petition of the Mahajirs vanished in Tiflis" (*45).
Representatives of the Abkhaz Mahajirs did apply to the head of the Georgian mission in Turkey, G. Rtskhiladze, on February 16, 1920, for the permission to be repatriated to Abkhazia. G. Rtskhiladze forwarded that petition to Paris, to N. Chkheidze. The matter concerned not only the Mahajirs but also other Moslems who wished to be repatriated. Here is G. Rtskhiladze's letter to N. Chkheidze, head of the Georgian delegation at the Conference in Paris:
"On February 16 I was visited by representatives of Abkhazians expatriated to Turkey, Marshania and Margania. They congratulated us with the recognition of Georgia's independence {in the January of 1920 Georgia was recognized de-facto by the Entente - A. M.) on their own behalf and on behalf of the Abkhaz expatriates and sent their congratulations to the Georgian government.
They said that they are, as well as all the Abkhaz people, supporters of unity with Georgia and will work for it in future. They inquired about the possible ways to repatriate the Abkhaz Mahajirs. According to them, there are about 150, 000 Mahajirs in the Ismit district of Turkey. I should point out, however, that the Mahajirs expatriated from all parts of Georgia are the subject of Turkey and their repatriation will take quite a few obstacles to overcome if the matter is not appropriately handled at the Conference. Therefore, I ask you to keep this in mind and put forth a demand that a special resolution should be adopted in the peace treaty with Turkey ensuring the right to be repatriated for those Mahajirs, who had been exiled to Turkey from the Caucasus during the Russian rule. To put those rights in effect a period of several years can be assigned and a special commission representing both the parties ought to be formed to determine the requirements of those who can enjoy that right. This condition will be effective of only for the Abkhaz, but also for Mohammedan Georgians wishing to return home. I made no promises to the Abkhazians; only notified them that I would bring their wish to your knowledge. A duplicate of the Abkhaz letter is enclosed" (*46).
The affair was set going, and on April 7, 1920 N. Chkheidze sent a letter to Chairman of the Allie's Supreme Council: "Very many Mohammedans of Georgia and Abkhazia who had been compelled to leave their homeland in different times, settled down within Ottoman Empire, particularly, after the signing of Berlin Treaty (1878), due to the anti- Moslem policy conducted by the Russian government then and later on in Georgia. The Georgian and Abkhaz Mohammedans, particularly those who came from Batumi and Sukhumi districts and named "Mahajirs", as they were exiled for religious reasons, quite often expressed their wish to return, but their repatriation was impossible during the Russian rule.
Independent Georgia is eager, on the contrary, to make it as easy as
possible for her scattered children to come back home. And to make it
sure that Turkey or any Other country, which is a heir of Ottoman
Empire, should not object to repatriation of Georgian emigrants, it
would be very important to include in the future treaty with Turkey a
clause that would guarantee free return to Georgia of all who had left
it because of political and religious considerations and would wish to
return now.
I have the honour to ask you, Your Excellency, to present the above
petition of the people and government of Georgia to the Supreme Council"
(*47).
This all implies that the Mahajir's petition did not "vanish in
Tiflis" as G: Dzidzaria put it; the government of Georgia submitted the
question of the Mahajirs repatriation, which worried the Abkhaz people
so much, to the Supreme Council of the Entente for discussion. The
government of the Georgian Democratic Republic consistently defended the
interests of the Georgian as well as Abkhaz people on the international
arena.
At the same time the Russian clerical circles enhanced straggle against
the Georgian Orthodox Church in Abkhazia in connection with the
autocephality of the Georgian church and declaration of independence of
Georgia.
Sir Oliver Wordrop, Supreme Commissar of Great Britain in Transcaucasia asked E. Gegechkori, the Georgian minister of foreign affairs, to tell him how much substantiated were the statements of the Russian authorities that "in Sukhumi Russian clergymen Golubtsov and Protopopov and a parish secretary Avtonomov had been exiled for an attempt to prevent Georgians from seizing a local orthodox church (*48).
The selfsame note cited some extracts from a report of Denikin's representative at the Peace Conference, S. Sazonov, the Tsar's ex-minister of foreign affairs, to Lord Curson, in which he said that the " Georgian authorities seem to attempt sequestration of Russian churches not only in Georgia, but also in place, like Sukhumi, which have nothing in common with Georgia" (*49). As that note showed, A. Denikin and his government would not recognize Abkhazia as a part of Georgia, and hence came the attitude of the Russian clerical circles in Abkhazia.
As for accusation of "seizing" the local orthodox church (it was Sukhumi Cathedral - A. M.), it should be noted that Sukhumi (Takumo - Bedi) eparchy used to be within the Georgian church for many centuries. When in 1917 the Georgian church became autocephal, Sukhumi eparchy included Samurzakano, Abkhazia and part of the Black Sea gubernia and the eparchy was headed by Right Reverend Sergii, a Russian bishop (*50).
The Russian clerical and civil authorities made a decision to exclude
all the Georgian parishes from the eparchy in 1917. Over 50 of them went
to the Georgian catholicosate, and the Black Sea Russian parishes joined
a newly formed Black Sea — Novorossiisk eparchy. The other parishes: 30
Abkhazians, 11 Greek and 6 Russian ones located in the territory of
Georgia and Georgian catholicosate, remained under the authority of
Sukhumi bishop Sergii, against all the church regulations (*51).
In the March of 1919 the Right Rev. Sergii left Sukhumi in connection
with some new assignment. On September 1st the Commissariat of Abkhazia
issued a degree concerning the orthodox churches of Abkhazia which read:
"a) to consider the Sukhumi Bishop Chair vacant and to take urgent
measures for its occupation as soon as possible by a permanent and
independent bishop; b) to declare the Cathedral of Sukhumi with the
house of the clergy, the bishop's house and the building of the former
school to be the- national property of Abkhazia" (*52).
The Commissariat of Abkhazia applied to the Georgian Catholicosate Council to charge Metropolitan of Chkondidi Ambrosi with temporary management of Sukhumi eparchy. The Metropolitan suggested the member of the cathedral clergy to continue their services... But some of the members, that were Russian by origin turned down that proposal. Archpriest Golubtsov, priest Protopopov and Secretary Avtonomov refused in written form to follow the directions of Metropolitan Ambrosi "in view of the prohibition to communicate with representatives of the Georgian church issued by the Provisional Highest Ecclesiastical Authority" (*53).
On October 7, 1919, Metropolitan Ambrosi called a special meeting of
the Sukhumi eparchy clergy "to settle the church affairs and... elect
the bishop" (*54). That special council of
Sukhumi eparchy, which consisted of the deans and representatives of all
Abkhaz, Greek, Georgian and Russian parishes (one from each) took into
account both the cultural and historic relations of Abkhazia and
Georgia, and the fact that "as Abkhazia has joined the Georgian
Democratic Republic as its autonomous part, it is inadmissible to have a
foreign church authority here, and drew the following resolution:
1) An independent eparchy of the Georgia catholicosate is to be restored
on the territory of autonomous Abkhazia, and named Sukhumi-Abkhaz
eparchy;
2) The eparchy is to be headed by an independent bishop who will have a
Chair and residence in the town of Sukhumi;
3) The Sukhumi-Abkhaz eparchy is to include all the parishes,
monasteries and church offices for different nationalities between the
rr. Inguri and Mekhadyr" (*55).
In this way Sukhumi Cathedral and the church property were given back
to their legitimate owners and were not to be returned or taken outside
Georgia as the Russian clericals insisted. An application of the
Georgian Catholicosate Council to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Georgian Republic said that "Archpriest Golubtsov, priest Pratopopov and
Secretary Avtonomov were driven out of Sukhumi for anti-government
propaganda and an attempt to incite one part of the population against
another" (*56).
In the Spring of 1919 a newly elected People's Council of Abkhazia
(instead of the Abkhaz People's Council) submitted an Act of Abkhazia's
Autonomy signed by Chairman Emukhvari to the Constitutional Assembly of
Georgia. The Act reads: At the meeting of 20 March, 1919, the first
People's Council of Abkhazia elected by popular, direct, equal and
secret ballot ordered, on behalf of all peoples of Abkhazia: 1) Abkhazia
is a part of the Democratic Republic of Georgia as an autonomous unit,
and this fact is to be brought to knowledge of the government of the
Republic of Georgia and its Constitutional Assembly; 2) in order to
compile a constitution of autonomous Abkhazia and establish
relationships between the control and autonomous authorities, a
commission consisting of equal number of members from the Constitutional
Assembly of Georgia and People's Council of Abkhazia is to be elected,
in order to elaborate provisions which will be included in the
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia after being adopted
at the Constitutional Assembly of Georgia and People's Council of
Abkhazia" (*57). The Constitutional Assembly
of
Georgia accepted that Act and sent back a greeting to the People's
Council of Abkhazia.
The government of Georgia more than once announced its wish to grant a
wide autonomy to Abkhazia. This was confirmed in N. Zhordania's talk
with a British general on February 23, 1919 (*58).
The government of Georgia thought that it was up to the Constitution to
define the form of political structure of Abkhazia. The discussion of
the draft constitution of Georgia slowed down. The constitutional
commission elaborated the draft and submitted it to the Constitutional
Assembly on June 14, 1920 (*59). And it was
only on February 21, 1921, when the government of Georgia was actually
being overturned, that the constitution was adopted and put into effect.
The People's Council of Abkhazia was not quite unanimous in respect
of the question of Abkhazia's autonomy. The Council had 7 fractions: 27
Socialist Democrats (Mensheviks), 3 Socialist Revolutionaries, 1 Social
Federalist, 1 National Democrat, 1 Colonist group, 4 Independent
Socialists (supporters of independent Abkhazia, 3 extreme Right
elements.
In the July of 1919 the People's Council of Abkhazia was discussing the
draft Constitution of autonomous Abkhazia but it was not adopted as the
independence-minded deputies managed to block it. Even a compromise
version offered by the Commissariate failed (the Commissariat created on
May 13, 1919, was an executive body on the territory of Abkhazia, which
introduced zemstvo self-governed bodies there) (*60).
The attitude of the Georgian government to the order of elaboration and
adoption of the Constitution" of Abkhazia slightly changed later. An
application of members of the constitutional committee of the People's
Council of December 5, 1920, stated: ..Subject to the Act of Abkhazian's
Autonomy of 20.03.1919, adopted by the People's Council, the
Constitution of Abkhazia is previously elaborated by a commission
consisting of equal members of representatives of the People's Council
of Abkhazia and the Constitutive Assembly of Georgia and adopted by both
of the legislative bodies.
With this in view, the Peoples Council of Abkhazia sent its representatives to Tiflis to apply to the Presidium of the Constitutional Assembly with a suggestion of assigning a plenipotentiary commission for the above said purpose. In the reply the Presidium of the Constitutional Assembly put forward a new provision on Abkhazia's autonomy which implied that this issue was exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Assembly of Georgia, with the delegation's function in the process of elaboration being only informative ones, and the People's Council of Abkhazia being completely kept away from any participation in the adoption of the Constitution.
Due to such fundamental disagreement in the outlook between the
People's Council of Abkhazia and central authority concerning the order
of elaboration and adoption of Abkhazia's Constitution, the delegation
is leaving for home (*61).
Minister of Interior Affairs of Georgia N. Ramishvili many times
confirmed the inviolability of Abkhazia's autonomy leaflets with his
speech were distributed all over Abkhazia, even in the most distant
villages and settlements (*62).
Another application of the delegation of the People's Council of Abkhazia to the Georgian government pointed out that the People's Council was sending a delegation to the Constitutional Assembly to establish finally the relationships between Georgia and Abkhazia, with the Georgian Extraordinary Envoy taking part in the preparatory work of the People's Council. However, the desired results were not achieved.
"The relations between Georgia and Abkhazia aren't yet made formal
and, consequently, not compulsory legally for both sides. Therefore it
is necessary for welfare of both the nations to enhance the legislative
settlement of the relations...
The people of Abkhazia have been waiting for this Constitution for three
years, and the present delegation, guided exclusively by the interests
of the whole nation, finds no valid reasons for new delays, for which
the People's Council will not take responsibility any longer, bringing
this to the knowledge of the whole population of Abkhazia", said the
address of the People's Council of Abkhazia (*63).
On December 29, 1920 a minor constitutional commission produced draft
"Provision of autonomous governing of Abkhazia" which was approved on
February 21, 1921, by the Constitutional Assembly of Georgia alongside
with the Constitution of Georgia.
The first clause of the Provision stated that Abkhazia, from the r.
Mekhadyr to the r. Inguri, from the Black Sea shores to the Caucasioni
is an integral part of the Georgian Republic and governs autonomously
its internal affairs (*64).
Autonomous Abkhazia had its local legislative body, i.e. the People's
Council elected by popular, direct, equal, secret and proportional
ballot, and consisting of 30 deputies (*65).
The commissariat of Abkhazia elected by the People's Council was
Abkhazia's executive organ. The 7th clause declared the Georgian
language to be state language of Abkhazia. But the People's Council was
unable to introduce local language in schools, offices (*66).
It would be interesting to look into the respective standpoint of the
political parties present at the Georgian Constitutional Assembly. On
August 2, 1919, debates started at the Constitutional Assembly
concerning an application of the National Democrats on the events and
situation in Sukhumi district. In the course of the debates it was
pointed out that owing to a particular complexity of the situation (with
the struggle inside the country and Denikin's intervention from outside)
the government should exercise a sane and cautious policy. One of the
speakers, Minister of interior affairs Ramishvili, said: "Leftwing
elements, namely, independent socialists, are against our statehood...
But majority of the People's Soviet of Abkhazia as well as of the
population of Abkhazia do not support secession of the country from
Georgia and think that it must exercise the rights of autonomy within
Georgia" (*67).
V. Gurjua, a Socialist Democrat of Abkhazia said that the interests of
Abkhazia are closely connected with the Georgian Republic, that the
Abkhazians consider themselves as its rightful citizens. He appealed the
Constitutional Assembly to adopt the constitution made up by the Abkhaz
People's Council, emphasizing that Abkhazia would be independent only in
the internal affairs (*68).
Another speaker, B. Chkhikvishvili, a Social Democrat, reminded the
meeting of Georgia's services to Abkhazia in defending its integrity
against Denikin and anarchy, in assisting the People's Council to carry
out organizational measures, agrarian reforms, etc. The speaker said
that more half of the People's Council are supporters of Abkhazia's
autonomy within Georgia.
Touching upon the question of hostile feelings of the Abkhazians towards
Georgians the speaker explained it as a result of tsarism's policy
"divide et impera" founded on strife and hatred between nations;
besides, it was necessary to keep in mind the smaller number and
cultural backwardness of the Abkhaz population, as compared to the
others - Georgians, Russians, Armenians, Greeks - inhabiting the land,
which had certainly affected the people's psychology. "With this in view
it is necessary to encourage development of culture and formation of
Abkhaz intelligentsia (*69).
The hostile feelings were also to the economic inferiority the
Abkhazians, since the economy in the towns was managed mainly by
Armenians, Georgians or others.
A Social Revolutionary Leo Shengelia spoke of the indefinite situation in Sukhumi with Denikin's supporters on ''one side and Georgia-oriented elements on the other. The nationalistically minded intelligentsia, though small in number, was aspiring for independence. Shengelia blamed the Georgian government for this latter tendency which he thought had resulted from the agrarian reform. The peasants demanded for the land being turned over to them and not purchased and sold. Even the first step of the reform was not completed: the land of the landowners was not confiscated; the zemstva had been introduced only a month before that. Speaking on the national policy the speaker added that they should not ignore the reality, namely, that "majority of the Abkhaz population speak Russian not only in Abkhazia proper, but in Samurzakano too where most of the inhabitants are Mingrelians. Therefore, we think that nationalization carried out as "a swoop, tip-and-run attack" would incur grave damage upon us... In our opinion nationalization should be carried on from below with the heaviest burden on the zemstva which must introduce Georgian schools.
Independent Abkhazia is absurd. On the very next day it will support
Denikin. There shouldn't be any separate government. Abkhazia must have
broad internal autonomy" (*70).
A National Democrat S. Kedia criticized the government's policy in
Abkhazia as it didn't manage to take into account properly the specific
features of that outlying region of Georgia and the anti-Georgian
tendencies implanted by the tsarism and the Russian clerical circles. He
called for restoration of the close historic friendly relations between
the Georgian and Abckhaz peoples (*71).
Those debates revealed that all the political parties supported autonomy
for Abkhazia; nevertheless, legalization of that act was delayed till
February 21, 1921.
After the establishment of the Soviet power in Georgia, the Communist
party made the First actual steps toward Soviet based national-state
construction. Even before that the leaders of Abkhaz and Georgian
Communists had agreed that "the Sukhumi party organization must be a
part of the Georgian one, and Abkhazia must become a part of the
Georgian SSR with the rights of an autonomy."
However, two sessions of the responsible officials of Abkhazia that took
place in the early March of 1921 made a decision to declare Abkhazia as
an independent republic and to form the Communist Party of Abkhazia (*72).
On March 27, 1921, E. Eshba applied to S. Orjonikidze on behalf of
Abkhazian Revcom for sanction to declare Abkhazia an independent
socialist republic or an autonomous republic federated directly in the
RSFSR (*73). He explained that the Menshevik
policy had "caused a tendency to national self-determination among
Abkhazians." As we can see, that national self-determination was to be
realized at the expense of destruction of the integral Georgian state.
"The Abkhazians constitute 80% of the Sukhumi district population," - Eshba continued, - "and they do not wish to be part of Georgia." The question is: When could the Communist of of Abkhazia manage to carry out a referendum among the Abkhazians? And then, the Abkhazians could not constitute 80% as their total number was 36000 at that time (*74), and they were a minority with respect to the Georgians. From his viewpoint, declaration of independence would confirm the liberation mission of the Red Army and make a favorable impression abroad. Eshba's demand was firm, otherwise he would not bear any responsibility.
The proposal made by Abkhazian Revcom was somehow unexpected to E.
Eshba. He said: "We thought that Abkhazia would exist as a part of
Soviet Georgia but when we arrived here and realized the actual
situation... we decided unanimously that in order to get rid of the
national strife it is necessary, at least temporarily, before the
Congress of the Soviets, to declare Abkhazia's independence" (*75).
S. Orjonikidze was surprised to hear such formulation of the question.
As for the federation with the RSFSR, as he said, in the West it would
be interpreted as annexation of Abkhazia by Moscow. Consequently, he
agreed to declare Abkhazia and independent Soviet republic until the
question of its federation with RSFSR of Georgia was settled by the
center (*76).
Thus the attitude of the Abkhaz Communist Party leaders changed
radically after the establishment of the Soviet power, because, as it
was mentioned above, there had been an idea previously that Abkhazia
would be an autonomous republic of Georgia. What was the reason? On
February 21, 1921, i.e. a few days before Georgia became Soviet, the
Constitutional Assembly had adopted the Constitution of the Democratic
Republic of Georgia, wherein article 107 declared the autonomy of
Abkhazia, of Mohammedan Georgia (Batumi district) and Zakatala district,
as inseparable part of the Georgian Republic.
Obviously, the Abkhaz leaders decided that if the Constitution of the Democratic Republic had legalized Abkhazia's autonomy, the Soviet power had to go farther and proclaim its independence, demonstrating its "progressive" attitude to the national problem. And none realized that it was an outrageous violation of the integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and historic rights of the Georgia people. That approach was not a novelty for the Bolsheviks, since they had set forth the proposal of joining Sukhumi district to the Black Sea - Kuban Soviet Republic back in 1918.
Besides, the Abkhaz Bolsheviks had been influenced and pressed by the independent- minded elements of the People's Council of Abkhazia. By the way, a reference on E. Eshba in the report of an agent of outdoors surveillance submitted on April 5, 1921, to the head of secret operations department of Cheka (Security service) of Soviet Socialist Abkhazia and entitled "On the drawbacks in the work on Soviet construction by leaders of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia", stated: "Chairman of Revcom of Abkhazia comrade E. Eshba is a very humane man... and readily yields to the influence of the comrades round him... He is not very communistic in his approach to the cause of Soviet construction and basis of Communism" (*77).
The conversation between Secretary of Caucasian Bureau of the
Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) S, Orjonikidze and leader of the Abkhaz
Communists E, Eshba demonstrates how "simply and casually" were solved
such important issues as sovereignty and territorial integrity of a
Republic, whereas in the treaty signed between RSFSR and Georgia on May
7,1920, Soviet Russia admitted the Sukhumi district, i.e. Abkhazia, to
be "unconditionally a part of the Georgian state" (*78).
It was still back in the May of 1918 that Germany, in its agreement with
Democratic Georgia, also had admitted Sukhumi district to be a part of
Georgia (*79).
When the countries of the Entente and Turkey recognized Georgia de
facto and de jure in 1920-1921, it implied recognition of Abkhazia as
its integral part.
Therefore, the entry of Abkhazia into Georgia was based on international
laws and representatives of RSFSR S. Orjonikidze had no right to settle
that essential matter in such a haste.
On March 28, 1921, Bolshevik party leaders of Abkhazia and Georgia
met in Batumi to discuss the issue on the structure of the Soviet rule
and Communist Party of Abkhazia. They came to a decision subject to
which Abkhazia was proclaimed a Soviet socialist republic while its
federation with Soviet Russia or Soviet Georgia was open until the next
coming congress of Abkhazia's Soviets.
On May 21, 1921, the Georgian Revcom adopted a declaration of
independence of the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic which slated that
the final solution of the question of Abkhazia and Georgia relations
would be solved by the congresses of the Abkhazia and Georgian Soviets (*80).
The first congress of Abkhazian laborers representative that took
place on May 28, 1921, approved of the Georgian Revcom's declaration of
Abkhazia's independence and expressed their firm will to establish
"close ties and brotherhood with all the Soviet republics and, in the
first place, with the most closely related, culturally, economically and
geographically, workers and peasants of Soviet Georgia" (*81).
The declaration of the Georgian Revcom, however, ignored the interests
of the Georgians and other nationalities inhabiting Abkhazia and
composing majority of the population.
An irresponsible attitude characterized also the approach of Georgian and Transcaucasional governments to the problems of ethnic borders and national questions. Their hastily made decisions are affecting us adversely even now. That very haste, and also a wish to gain support of Abkhaz Communists made S. Orjonikidze give his consent to declare independence of the Abkhaz SSR. As far as the federation of Abkhazia with the RSFSR in concerned, this would have destroyed all the centuries-old economic, political and cultural relationships with the Georgian people and was therefore absolutely inapplicable, And then it reminded too much of tsarism's policy of annexation, exercised, as well by the Russian clergy and White Guard generals.
That standpoint of the Abkhaz leaders reflected the interests of the
local right separatist elements, on the one hand, and those officials in
Moscow for whom the question of national sovereignty was of an
as-a-matter-of-fact significance as compared with the "world
revolution."
On August 12, 1921, S. Orjonikidze reported to the district party
meeting: "In the matter of outlying district we fully adhere to a policy
of granting them the broadest sovereignty, even independence.
When Abkhazia demanded independence we told the Communists of Abkhazia that independence of such a tiny state is hardly possible, but in the long run, we agreed. We said that if the Abkhaz people does not trust Georgians, let Abkhazia be independent, let it heal the wounds inflicted by Mensheviks; they will soon see themselves the necessity of the closest union with their neighbor Georgia" (*82).
Nevertheless, the very first steps taken toward realization of the idea of independent Abkhazia demonstrated its economic and political inapplicability. For instance, a report on the Party work in Abkhazia in July-August, 1921, tells of a failure of the working plan of the Party and Soviet organizations for those months. Secretary of the Org-bureau of the Party Larionov suggested the following reasons: a small number of members in the Orgbureau and Revcom, with the same people working in both the organization, restricted activity of those people, "full lack of control and of responsibility to higher Party and Soviet bodies (i.e. independence of Abkhazia), fundamental differences in the standpoints between Chairman of Revcom Eshba and his assistant Lakoba that made it impossible for them to set up any direction in the work of Revcom and Orgbureau (as they were heads of both of those bodies). Various groups were formed causing damage to the work" (*83).
The report concluded that the structure of the Revcom bodies
(narcornats) did not meet any requirements of life and territorial size
of Abkhazia.
The question of forms of relations between Abkhazia and Georgia were
discussed at the highest Party levels many times. At a plenary meeting
of the Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party it was decided to "direct
the Party work towards integration of Abkhazia and Georgia with
autonomous Abkhazia within Georgia" (*84).
The question was discussed later at a broader plenary meeting of Party
Orgbureau and Revcom of Abkhazia. The declaration of Abkhazia's
independence was approved but it was agreed to set up the closest
contacts between Abkhazia and Georgia. However, the procedure for the
conclusion of a treaty was delayed by the objections of local
separatists, who were against any agreements with Georgia and would not
realize that Abkhazia could not exist apart from Georgia. Besides, some
of the officials had another idea: direct integration of Abkhazia with
the Transcaucasican Federation ("Zakfederatsia"), by-passing Georgia (*85).
On November 16, 1921, Presidium of the Caucasian Party Bureau concluded that "economic and political independence of Abkhazia is to be considered inapplicable" (*86). That resolution once more confirmed the incompetence of the artificial independence. And despite the formal declaration of independence, the Soviet and Party bodies of the republics and the center treated Abkhazia as an autonomous part of Georgia. This latter attitude was expressed in a letter of the Party Orgbureau secretary of Abkhazia to the Caucasian Bureau, where Abkhazia was referred to as "an independent republic from formal standpoint" {emphasis added) (*87).
There are some more facts that the declaration of independence was formal. In the May of 1921 RSFSR and Georgia signed an agreement of military-political and economic cooperation in the cause of Socialist construction (*88). Such agreements were signed in 1920-21 between Soviet Russia and all the other Soviet republics, but there was no special agreement with Abkhazia. Then on 13 September, 1921, at an international conference in Kars a friendly agreement was signed by Turkey, as one party and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as the other one. Thus, the Transcaucasian republics acted as independent legal subjects (with RSFSR participating), Abkhazia never being mentioned.
V. I. Lenin's attitude to the matter can be judged from his letter of
April 14, 1921, to the Communists of Caucasia, which he entitled as an
address to the Communists of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Daghestan,
Mountain Republic, Abkhazia was not mentioned (*89).
When V. I. Lenin's draft project of organization of the Transcaucasian
Republics Federation was adopted at the Politbureau of the Bolsheviks
Party Central Committee with minor alterations (on November 29, 1921),
it stated: "To recognize the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republics
as principally absolutely right one and unconditionally applicable,
however, premature, i.e. not to be realized immediately, as it will take
a certain period of time for consideration, propaganda and realization
through Soviets, from below; 2. To propose to the Central Committees of
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (through the Cavbureau) to set forth the
question of federation more broadly to be discussed by workers and
peasants and Party organizations; to conduct active propaganda for
federation and take it through meetings of Soviets in each of the
republics; to inform the Politbureau of CC of the Party, exactly and
timely, in case of a strong opposition" (*90).
It was suggested to unite three republics - Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Abkhazia was not mentioned as a member of the Federation.
On September 1, 1921, People's Commissar on national affairs I. V.
Stalin informed Secretary of All-Union Central Executive Committee A.
Enukidze that "Abkhazia is an autonomous part of independent Georgia,
consequently, it does not and must not have any independent
representatives in the RSFSR and, therefore, cannot receive any credit
from the RSFSR" (*91).
On December 16, 1921, Georgia and Abkhazia singed the union agreement
which was adopted by the first Congress of the Soviets of Abkhazia and
Georgia in 1922.
It is noteworthy that it was somehow customary to declare small
territories as Soviet Socialist Republics and, later, to reduce their
status to regions, districts, autonomous republics. For instance, in the
June of 1920 the Nakhichevan Soviet Socialist Republic- was created in
close economic contact with Azerbaijan. In 1923 it was turned into Auto-
nomous District of the Azerbaijan SSR, and a year later into Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic. In the same way, the Socialist Republics of
Stavropol, Kuban, Black Sea created in 1918, soon become districts of
the RSFSR.
On June 13, 1926, at the 3 rd session of the All-Georgian Central
Executive Committee in Sukhumi N. Lakoba made a report for the
government of Abkhazia, in which he refer- red to the relationships
between Georgia and Abkhazia: "From the onest, when the republic of
Abkhazia was formed, certain persons who are not quite aware of the
reality and who are our opponents, have been scheming the slackening of
the republican power in Abkhazia, complicating the process of creative
work in Abkhazia and Georgia, on the following basis: if Abkhazia wishes
to leave Georgia, it will, if it does not, it will not. Such ideas are
uttered even by those responsible officials who ought not even to think
in that way. These ideas are spread among the population, particularly,
the Abkhazians. Is it reasonable? In order to avoid any future
misunderstanding, it ought to be definitely stated that Abkhazia cannot
leave Georgia; it is neither going, nor wishing to do it. Abkhazia did
not include itself in Georgia, but Georgia shall do everything it can to
raise the cu- ltural and economic standards in Abkhazia. Georgia cannot
oppress Abkhazia" (*92). The treaty
relations between the Abkhaz SSR and Georgia continued till February
1931, when the 6th Congress of Soviets of Abkhazia and then 6th Congress
of Soviets of Georgia made a decision to turn Abkhazia into an
autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR.
It is curious enough to note that USSR Constitution of 1924 mentioned
"the Autonomous Republics of Ajaria and Abkhazia" as well as "Autonomous
Districts of South Ossetia, Mountain Karabakh and Nakhichevan" which
were to send "one representative each to the Council of Nationalties…"(*93).
A similar reference to the "Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia, Ajaristan (Ajaria) and South Ossetia" was made in a resolution of 27 February, 1922, of the CC Presidium of CP of Georgia concerning the "number of seats in the Central Executive Committee allotted by the Center to autonomous republics, army..." (*94).
It can be thus concluded from the above facts and sources that:
1. The progressive representatives of the Abkhaz people led by D. Gulia
traditionally presented Abkhazia as an integral and inseparable part of
Georgia and spared no efforts to strengthen and develop the historic
friendship and cooperation of the Georgian and Abkhazian peoples.
2. A tendency to seize Abkhazian territories was strong among the most
powerful circles of tsarist Russia, as well as the Russian clergy, who
were trying to include the Sukhumi eparchy in the Black Sea gubernia
with the purpose of future colonization of the Black Sea shores by
Russian and dissolving the Abkhaz population among the Russians, i.e.
its actual assimilation.
3. In the years of World War I, particularly in February-March, 1918,
the Turkish ruling circles became active and, by promising the
properties classes of Abkhazia some of their old privileges, they
incited the latter to secession of Abkhazia from Georgia and its
involvement into the Turkish sphere of influence.
4. The essence of Gen. Denikin's policy in 1918-1919 was seizure of
Abkhazia and its annexation as a part of integral and indivisible
Russia", which found support among some propertied representatives of
the Abkhaz people.
5. The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia adopted on
February 21, 1921 by the Constitutional Assembly, gave a just solution
to the Abkhaz problem, granting Abkhazia a status of autonomy within
Georgia. This satisfied the interests of the Georgian and Abkhaz
peoples, corresponded to their historic and cultural relationships.
Moreover, in the treaty of 7 May, 1920, signed between Georgia and the
RSFSR, Sukhumi district was recognized as an integral part of the
Georgian Democratic Republic.
6. Granting of the status of a Soviet socialist republic to Abkhazia in
1921 which later became agreement-based, was a demonstration of the
irresponsible attitude of Georgia's Revcom and Cavbureau of the
Bolshevik Party Central Committee to the settlement of
national-territorial issues as those organizations ignored the interests
of the Georgian people. Such an approach to the relationships between
the Georgian and Abkhaz peoples created prerequisites for breaking up
their brotherly historic relationships.
"Some national and ethnic problems in Georgia (1918-1922)" - Avtandil Menteshashvili
Web site is brought to you by Besiki Sisauri and it's a part of www.welcome.to/sakartvelo
© Copyright was given to web publisher by the author himself.
© Georgia's Publishing House "Samshoblo", 1992.